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NOTES
The Contract Clause: Revived or Revised?
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that state legislation had impaired preexisting contractual
rights and nullified the state acts as violative of the contract
clause. The author discusses the Court's most recent pronounce-
ment, criticizing the decision for not applying the "new test" of
its earlier decision and for misapplying the traditional analysis
developed from the landmark decision of Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell, 290 US. 398 (1934). With this revival of
the long dormant contract clause, the author speculates as to
whether it will be revised to protect individual rights in a modern
setting.
In 1963, the Allied Structural Steel Company, a Delaware cor-
poration with its principal place of business in Illinois and a division
office in Minnesota, instituted a pension plan for the benefit of its
employees.' According to the plan, an Allied employee became eligi-
ble to receive a retirement pension at age sixty-five regardless of the
length of his service with the company. In addition, the plan pro-
vided for the vesting of pension rights2 at an earlier age if certain
conditions regarding length of employment were satisfied. In no
case, however, would pension rights vest for anyone with less than
fifteen years continuous service with the company.' In 1974, the
Minnesota Legislature passed the Private Pension Benefits Protec-
tion Act4 (Act) which became effective on April 10th of that year.
The Act provided that upon the closing of a place of business cov-
1. The employer-initiated Allied plan was not the result of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, and none of its participants were union employees. The plan qualified as a single
employer pension plan under I.R.C. § 401.
2. A vested pension right is a "nonforfeitable right or interest which an employee partici-
pant acquires in the pension fund." HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENE-
Fr SECURrrY ACT OF 1973, H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973), reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4643 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 93-533].
Pension vesting refers, therefore, to an employee's right to receive funds credited to his
account in the event he should leave or lose his job prior to retirement.
3. Specifically, the Allied plan provided that a salaried employee was entitled to full
vesting of his pension for early retirement purposes: (1) if the employee was at least 60 years
old and had worked 15 continuous years with Allied; or (2) if the employee was at least 55
years old and the sum of his age and years of continuous company service equaled 75; or (3)
if the employee was less than 55 years old and the total of his age and years of continuous
company service was 80. An employee who quit or was discharged before age 65 prior to
meeting one of these three conditions did not acquire any pension rights under the Allied
plan. This particular type of retirement program is known as a fixed benefit plan.
4. MINN. STAT. §§ 181B.01-.17 (1976).
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ered by a private pension plan or upon termination of the plan itself,
any employee who had completed at least ten years of service with
that employer automatically possessed a vested right to all benefits
he would have received had the particular plan not been terminated
or had the business not been closed.5 The Act covered private em-
ployers of 100 or more individuals' and imposed a "pension funding
charge" upon those employers who terminated a pension plan or a
business in a manner resulting in forfeiture of benefits by employees
with ten or more years of consecutive service.7
Allied began discharging its Minnesota employees during the
summer of 1974 in anticipation of closing its division office. As a
result, the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry undertook
an investigation to determine what effect Allied's actions would
have on the pension benefits for terminated employees.' The De-
partment subsequently notified Allied that a pension funding
charge in the amount of $185,751 would be assessed against the
corporation to compensate those employees who had qualified for
pension benefits under the Minnesota Act but who had not obtained
vested rights under the program instituted by Allied. Allied sued the
Minnesota Attorney General in federal district court' contending,
inter alia, that the Act violated numerous provisions of the Consti-
tution of the United States. The district court convened a three-
judge panel which certified questions to the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota. 0 After receiving the answers of the supreme court," the
district court concluded that the Act did not deprive Allied of any
constitutional rights. On direct appeal from this decision, the Su-
preme Court of the United States, held, reversed: A statute which
5. Id. §§ 181B.03-.06.
6. Although Allied employed only 30 persons in Minnesota, it came within the purview
of the Act because the corporation as a whole had more than 100 employees.
7. The Minnesota Act provided for certain exceptions to the imposition of the pension
funding charge, none of which were applicable to Allied Structural Steel. See MINN. STAT. §
181B.07 (1976).
8. Notification of termination was required. Id. § 181B.08. Allied notified the Depart-
ment of Labor and Industry that it intended to terminate its Minnesota office. The Minnesota
division of Allied was finally closed in February, 1975.
9. The action was initially filed in the Federal District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois and later transferred on a venue ruling to the Federal District Court for the District
of Minnesota. Fleck v. Spannaus, 412 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1976). The pension funding
charge was not levied against Allied, pending outcome of the litigation.
10. Fleck v. Spannaus, 421 F. Supp. 20 (D. Minn. 1976). The certified questions involved
the possible preemption or termination of the Act by the passage of the Federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975)), and the possible effects ERISA would have on
the cause of action.
11. Fleck v. Spannaus, - Minn. -, 251 N.W.2d 334 (1976).
12. Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644 (1976).
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operates retrospectively to increase the compensation due from an
employer to an employee under a private pension plan severely
alters the contractual obligations between those individuals in vio-
lation of the contract clause of the Constitution. Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716 (1978).
Article I, section 10 of the Constitution prohibits a state from
passing any law that impairs contractual obligations."3 Although a
powerful tool for judicial review of state legislation,' 4 the contract
clause had not been used by the Supreme Court to invalidate state
law for nearly forty years. A 1977 decision, United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 15 revitalized the clause to strike down the retroactive
repeal of a statutory bondholders' covenant which limited the uses
of certain revenues of the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey." The latent power of the contract clause brought to the
surface by United States Trust was reemphasized by the Allied
decision in which the Court invalidated the Minnesota statute
solely because it impaired the obligation of a preexisting contract.
The dissent in Allied suggested that the framers of the Consti-
tution inserted the contract clause only as a means of protecting the
contractual obligations involved in debtor-creditor relationships. 7
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 provides: "No State shall . . . pass any ... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts."
14. Justice Black once remarked: "[Slo nearly universal are contractual relationships
that it is difficult if not impossible to conceive of laws which do not have either direct or
indirect bearing upon contractual obligations." Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 382 (1941)
(Black, J., dissenting). It is this pervasive character of contractual agreements that gives the
contract clause such potential strength.
15. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
16. In 1962, New York and New Jersey enacted legislation whereby the two states agreed
with each other and with Port Authority bondholders on the extent to which revenues and
reserve funds pledged as security to such bondholders could be used in the future to subsidize
passenger railroad facilities. The alleged purpose of this limitation was the promotion of
continued investor confidence in Port Authority bonds. Nevertheless, in 1974, the 1962 cove-
nant was retroactively repealed by both the New York and New Jersey Legislatures, thereby
preventing the bondholders from enforcing the covenant which had been in effect when the
bonds were purchased. Id. at 9.
For a more detailed description of the background of this case, see id. at 4-14.
17. Chief Justice Marshall felt otherwise, concluding in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), that the contract clause had been included in the Constitution
not to prevent specific types of laws but to establish the proposition that legislative enact-
ments must not interfere with contracts. According to Marshall, "[t]he Convention appears
to have intended to establish a great principle, that contracts should be inviolable." Id. at
206. Justice Sutherland disagreed, finding the contract clause to have been conclusively
framed and adopted to forbid legislation designed to lessen the remedial rights of creditors.
See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453-65 (1934) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, Justice Brennan, although admitting that Supreme Court decisions
had not confined the applicability of the clause to "debtor-relief" laws, placed great emphasis
on the debtor-creditor relationship as the basis for inclusion of the contract clause in the
Constitution. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716, 2728-29 & n.5 (1978)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Whether this suggestion is an accurate portrayal of the framers'
intent, its limited view was rejected by the Marshall Court which
construed the contract clause to extend protection not only to con-
tracts between individuals (whether or not a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship existed) but also to all "public contracts," e.g., agreements
between states and individuals."8 The application of the contract
clause was subsequently restricted to those cases in which state
legislation retroactively impaired existing contracts. 9
From 1810 (the year the Supreme Court first considered the
import of the contract clause) 0 until the latter portion of the nine-
teenth century, the constitutional prohibition against the impair-
ment of contractual obligations was used by the Court as an impor-
tant means of ordering the relationships between state and individ-
ual.2" Assertions of contract clause violations were before the Court
more frequently during this period than allegations regarding in-
fringements of any other constitutional provision except for the
commerce clause. Between the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
The lack of certainty as to the precise historical meaning to be given the contract clause
was succinctly described by an early 20th century commenator, who stated: "It is reasonably
safe to assert that there is perhaps no clause in the entire Constitution the origin and intend-
ment of which is subject to greater obscurity and doubt." Johnson, The Contract Clause of
the United States Constitution, 16 Ky. L.J. 222, 222 (1928). See generally B. WRIGHT, THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 1-25 (1938); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Con-
tract Clause, 57 HARV. L. REv. 512, 512-13 (1944).
18. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (corporate charters
come within protection of contract clause); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122
(1819) (retrospective interference with the rights and obligations of individuals under a preex-
isting private contract impairs the obligation of contracts); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 164 (1812) (legislative repudiation of a grant of tax exemption violates contract
clause); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (conveyance of public land receives
contract protection). See also B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 268-79 (1965) (discussion of Chief Justice Marshall's role in expansion of
contract clause); B. WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 27-60 (same).
19. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924) (contract clause applicable to legisla-
tive acts but not to judicial decisions); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827)
(contract clause does not prohibit laws which operate only prospectively). The rule in Ogden
has never been overturned. The Tidal Oil Co. proposition has been the subject of certain
exceptions. See, e.g., Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
20. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). The case occupies a dual role in
constitutional history as it was also the first case in which the Supreme Court held a state
statute invalid on constitutional grounds.
21. The influence of the early contract clause decisions on economic and legal develop-
ments in the United States has perhaps been overemphasized by historians and legal com-
mentators alike. As Professor Gunther has pointed out, the cases did indeed restrain state
activity "but they did not compel legislative paralysis .... The lack of statutory restrictions
on corporations in the 19th century, for example, was probably more attributable to the
legislators' unwillingness to enact such laws than to any constitutionally imposed incapaci-
ties." G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 605 (9th ed. 1975).
22. B. WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 91-92. Almost half of all decisions prior to 1889 in which
the Court invalidated state legislation were based upon contract clause violations. Id. at 95.
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ries, however, the significance of the contract clause as a substantial
restraint on state interference with property rights began to wane.
Its decline as a controlling force paralleled the rise of substantive
due process as the primary measure of the validity of state economic
regulation.2" When the judicial focus later shifted away from sub-
stantive due process,24 the contract clause remained idle as a result
of a concomitant expansion in the scope of the state police power.
Although perhaps not easily defined, 5 the concept of inaliena-
ble police power rests upon the theory that laws enacted to protect
public interests should not be circumvented by arrangements made
by individual parties. Certain legislation passed pursuant to the
police power may be valid, therefore, regardless of its effect upon
contractual obligations.2" Thus, in the early 1900's when the scope
of the police power was deemed to include not only public health,
safety and morals but the general welfare as well,27 the reach of the
contract clause necessarily diminished.2" As the twentieth century
23. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), was the first Supreme
Court decision in which the due process clause furnished the basis for holding a state regula-
tory law invalid. Following this decision, the Court widened the scope of due process in much
the same way that the contract clause had been enlarged by the judicial branch in earlier
days.
24. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See also Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Writing for the Court, Justice Black said: "We have returned
to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and eco-
nomic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws." Id. at 730.
However, the due process clause has been used in subsequent decisions holding legislative
acts invalid. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
502 (1965) (White, J., concurring). See generally Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972
Term-Foreward: Toward a Model of Rolls in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 5-10 (1973).
25. The term "police power" does not appear'in the Constitution. A general listing of
what constitutes the police power of a state might include regulation of the following: high-
ways, railways, and motor vehicles; buildings, housing, zoning and urban development; labor
relations; health and sanitation; public markets, trade and commerce. Bond, Enhancing the
Security Behind Municipal Obligations: Flushing and U.S. Trust Lead the Way, 6 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1, 9 n.44.
26. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 46-49 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
27. Justice Brown, writing for the Court in 1905, stated:
It only remains to consider, in connection with this branch of the case,
whether the act of the General Assembly of 1903 was a proper exercise of the police
power of the State. Of this we have no doubt. Although it was not an exercise of
that power in its ordinarily accepted sense of protecting the health, lives and
morals of the community, it is defensible in its broader meaning of providing for
the general welfare of the people . ...
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 481 (1905).
28. The police power concept prevailed even when courts were construing the doctrine
narrowly as evidenced by 19th century cases in which laws enacted to ensure public health
and public morals were sustained, free from contract clause limitations. See, e.g., Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879) (lottery franchise to extend for 25 years may be repealed after
19791
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progressed and the reach of state police power expanded, the con-
tract clause declined to a point of insignificance.
The demise of the contract clause as a "mighty instrument for
the protection of the rights of private property""9 culminated in 1934
in the landmark case of Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell.30 At issue in Blaisdell was a Minnesota statute which
imposed a two year moratorium on mortgage foreclosures in order
to prevent widespread loss of property during the depression. In
Blaisdell, the Court accepted the established view that government
police power could qualify the contract clause. The concern of the
Court, therefore, was whether the statute was a valid exercise of the
state's reserved power. That determination rested on whether the
statute addressed a legitimate end and the means to that end were
reasonable and appropriate. Based on this rationale, the Court sus-
tained the legislation. Moreover, while the Court noted that the
temporary nature of the act and the emergency context giving rise
to it were crucial, the Court indicated that great freedom was to be
accorded the states in their regulatory actions since "the reasonable
exercise of the protective power of the State is read into all con-
tracts."3
Although the broad language of the Blaisdell opinion implied
that the contract clause had perhaps been laid to rest, several cases
immediately following the decision voided state enactments for not
three years); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (franchise to carry fertilizer in
the street may be repealed).
29. B. WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 28. In 1914, a Supreme Court opinion described the
contract clause in the following fashion:
lit is settled that neither the "contract" clause nor the "due process" clause
has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that
are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor
bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract
and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise..
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914).
30. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Blaisdell was decided the same year as Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934), the leading case heralding the decline of judicial intervention in economic
regulation. In Nebbia, the Court stated that "[i]f the laws passed are seen to have a reasona-
ble relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied." Id. at 537.
31. 290 U.S. at 444. The rationale of Blaisdell was that the reserved powers of a state
are implied in every contract. In a later decision, this notion was behind the proposition that
the state never impairs a contract because the exercise of its powers is only the enforcement
of an implied condition in the contractual agreement. East N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S.
230, 232 (1945). However, in an earlier decision, Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905),
the Court followed a different line of reasoning and conceded that contractual obligations
could be impaired by the state because the state's power to protect its citizens was paramount
to the established agreements. Both theories involve questioning the validity of the state
power at issue and therefore possess a similar underlying rationale.
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being as limited in application as the Minnesota law. These deci-
sions lent credibility to the view that the Blaisdell majority had
merely sustained a particular statute in a particular situation rather
than announced a general rule.2 In subsequent decisions, such as
Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Association33 and East New
York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 3  the Supreme Court again moved
toward a general denial of the contract clause in favor of police
power regulations by not retaining the Blaisdell limitations of emer-
gency and temporary conditions as prerequisites for sustaining legis-
lation over contract clause objections. Nevertheless, Wood v.
Lovett 5 in 1941 was the last Supreme Court decision, until 1977,
that invalidated a state law as a violation of the contract clause.
During that nearly forty year hiatus, the Supreme Court upheld
Blaisdell in El Paso v. Simmons, 3 a decision validating a legislative
act which limited to a five year period the reinstatement rights of
state land purchasers after forfeiture for nonpayment of interest.
37
The "dusting off" of the contract clause which occurred in
United States Trust involved consideration of a "public contract,"
rather than a private contractual arrangement as was the circum-
stances in Blaisdell. Although the Court noted that unusual defer-
ence is given to lawmaking authorities in the face of a challenge by
the contract clause, it decided that this deferential policy was inap-
propriate in a case where the state was a party to the very contract
the legislature was attempting to limit.3 8 This element of self-
interest led the Court to set up a double standard of review. It
strictly applied the "reasonable and necessary to serve an important
public purpose" test, 3 used in determining the constitutionality of
a contract impairing a statute when the state was a party to the
contract." With regard to agreements between individuals, how-
ever, Justice Blackmun noted that a state was entitled to a less rigid
32. See Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936); Worthen Co. v. Kavan-
augh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
33. 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
34. 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
35. 313 U.S. 362 (1941).
36. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
37. Although the state was a party to the land sale contracts at issue in Simmons, the
Court did not mention, much less analyze, this factor in its opinion. The decision rests heavily
on the Blaisdell decision for support.
38. 431 U.S. at 26.
39. Id. at 25.
40. For interesting opposing viewpoints on the United States Trust dual standard, see
Bond, supra note 25; 55 U. Dar. J. URB. L. 200 (1977). The author of the latter commentary
disagreed with the selection of the self-interest element as the basis for the double standard
in United States Trust. Id. at 209. A similar view was taken in The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 89-90 (1977).
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standard of judicial scrutiny when it interfered with private contrac-
tual obligations, as in Blaisdell, then when it sought to change its
own pacts, as in United States Trust." Statutes which allegedly
impaired the obligations of public contracts would be subject to a
stricter standard of review than statutes which allegedly impaired
the obligations of private contracts.
The dual standard of review articulated in United States Trust
was not controlling in Allied, where state impairment of preexisting
contractual obligations between private parties was alleged. Al-
though noting that the United States Trust decision was one in
which the state itself was a party to the contract at issue, the Allied
majority sidestepped the major import of the decision by relegating
discussion of the dual standard of review to a somewhat cursory
footnote." The Court, while acknowledging the "particular scru-
tiny" exercised in the United States Trust decision,4" did not come
to terms with its own recently articulated two-tiered approach to the
contract clause, preferring instead to cite United States Trust for
the general proposition that "[liegislation adjusting the rights and
responsibilities of contracting parties must be upon reasonable con-
ditions and of a character appropriate to the public purpose justify-
ing its adoption.""
In lieu of dealing more fully with United States Trust, the
Court in Allied turned to Blaisdell and its immediate progeny.,' The
Court listed the five factors which the Court in Blaisdell had
deemed supportive of the moratorium legislation: (1) the existence
of a state of emergency; (2) relief appropriately tailored to the emer-
gency; (3) a basic societal interest in need of protection; (4) the
temporary quality of the legislation; and (5) the reasonable nature
41. 431 U.S. at 22-23, 25-26.
42. 98 S. Ct. at 2723 n.15.
The footnote, in its entirety, reads:
[In United States Trust, tihe Court indicated that impairments of a State's
own contracts would face more stringent examination under the Contract Clause
than would laws regulating contractual relationships between private parties,
• . . although it was careful to add that "private contracts are not subject to
unlimited modification under the police power."
Id. (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 2722 (citing 431 U.S. at 22).
44. Id.
45. The United States Trust case involved consideration of a "public contract" and is,
therefore, distinguishable from the Allied situation on that ground. Moreover, the United
States Trust case dealt with the spending and borrowing powers of the state, categories the
Court deemed were outside the interests of a state. See 431 U.S. at 23-25. But see id. at 51-
52 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (labeling covenant as "purely financial" should not determine
contract clause analysis). Whatever distinction may be drawn between United States Trust
and Allied, however, the Court cannot be said to have addressed adequately its decision in
the former in reaching its conclusion in the latter. '
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of imposed conditions." Upon reviewing the enumerated factors, the
Court concluded that had the legislation in Blaisdell not possessed
these particular characteristics, the Minnesota moratorium statute
would not have been sustained. In support of this reasoning, the
majority relied upon Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 7 Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh" and Treigle v. Acme Homestead Association" as evi-
dence that the rather sweeping language of Blaisdell was limited by
the factual context of the case."'
Justice Brandeis, following Thomas and Kavanaugh, articu-
lated a similar view when writing for the majority in Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford." He noted that the statute in
Blaisdell was directly related and confined to its factual cdntext
2
but was unable to find such a relationship in the case before him.
He wrote:
Statutes for the relief of mortgagors, when applied to pre-
6xisting mortgages, have given rise, from time to time, to serious
46. 98 S. Ct. at 2721-22.
47. 292 U.S. 426 (1934). In Thomas, the Court held that "substantial rights" had been
altered by the state statute. They reasoned that legislation may have an effect on existing
contracts if it met a public need and "the relief afforded (had a] reasonable relation to the
legitimate end to which the State [was] entitled to direct its legislation." Id. at 433. The
Court determined that the sustaining of a mortgage moratorium law in Blaisdel was due to
its temporary and conditional relief as well as the limited exigency to which the legislation
was addressed. In the instant case, the statute considered did not offer either temporary or
conditional relief, nor did it contain provisions limiting its time or circumstances. Unable to
find the essential public purpose within its factual context, the Court concluded that the
legislation substantially impaired preexisting contractual arrangements and violated the con-
tract clause.
48. 295 U.S. 56 (1934). The Kavanaugh decision followed the rule laid out in Thomas.
Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo found that an Arkansas statute, changing the
method of payment of assessments on mortgages held on lands in an improvement district,
violated the contract clause. Justice Cardozo referred to the factual context in which the
Blaisdell case arose and noted the relationship of the legislation to that context. Id. at 63.
Unable to find the same relationship in the Arkansas statute, it could not be upheld as it
impaired the contractual rights beyond any reasonable public purpose.
49. 297 U.S. 189 (1936). In Triegle, state legislation was also held to violate the contract
clause. The Court found no discernible public purpose, id. at 196, in the legislation and found
that the means adopted were unreasonable. Though only referring to Blaisdel in a footnote,
id. at 197 n.6, the Court implied that the action there was a proper exercise of police power
while in Treigle it was not.
The inference that can be drawn from the Thomas/Kavanaugh/Triegle line of cases is
that whether impairment will be considered substantial enough to find a violation of the
contract clause depends upon the factual context in which the legislation arises and the
relationship of the statute to that factual context. The references to Blaisdell in the above
three cases indicated that the Court found the necessary link in Blaisdell, between the factual
context and the legislation, to hold that the state had properly exercised its reserved powers.
50. For example, the Court in Blaisdell declared that "the reservation of essential attrib-
utes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order." 290 U.S.
at 435.
51. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
52. Id. at 597-98.
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constitutional questions. The statutes were sustained by this
Court when, as in Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, ...
they were found to preserve substantially the right of the mortga-
gee to obtain, through application of the security, payment of the
indebtedness. They were stricken down, as in W.B. Worthen Co.
v. Kavanaugh, . . . when it appeared that-this substantive right
was substantially abridged.",
The constitutionality of a state statute rested on its relationship
with the factual context in which the impairment of preexisting
rights was considered.
The Allied Court's reading of Blaisdell in light of cases like
Kavanaugh should be interpreted as an affirmation of the proposi-
tion that only substantial impairment of preexisting contractual
rights is to be of constitutional concern. Such a deduction is reason-
able given the pervasive character of both contractual arrangements
and state police powers within our present society. In attempting to
balance these coexisting elements, Justice Stewart's majority opin-
ion in Allied posited that the contract clause has never been deemed
to obliterate the police power of the state. Yet, Justice Stewart
continued, if the clause is to retain any substance of its own, a point
must exist at which the prohibition places some limits upon state
infringement of contractual relationships."4 In reaching this point,
the Court initially inquired into the degree of impairment and rec-
ognized that the contract clause was not subject to an absolute
interpretation. Moreover, such inquiry resembled the approach
taken in United States Trust where Justice Blackmun stated: "[A]
finding that there has been a technical impairment is merely a
preliminary step in resolving the more difficult question whether
that impairment is permitted under the Constitution."" Apparently
in accord with the United States Trust decision at this level of
analysis, the Allied majority ignored the more significant factor of
United States Trust: the state is entitled to greater deference from
the judicial branch when the state interferes with private contrac-
tual obligations, as in Blaisdell, than when the state seeks to modify
its own covenants, as in United States Trust.
Having sidestepped the major import of the United States
Trust decision, the Allied opinion also failed to explore adequately
the question of whether an "enlargement of contractual obligation"
is to be viewed as an impairment for purposes of contract clause
application. In a footnote, the Court cited cases which bolster the
53. Id. at 581.
54. 98 S. Ct. at 2721.
55. 431 U.S. at 21.
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premise that this proposition has been answered affirmatively in the
past, although the matter was not addressed in depth in any of the
cited decisions."' Dissenting in Allied, Justice Brennan argued that
while the Minnesota Act increased the burdens placed upon Allied
Structural Steel, such burdens were the result of positive social
legislation, the impact of which must be dealt with through due
process analysis.5 Although necessarily raising the collateral ques-
tion of the relationship of the contract clause to due process, the
Court's settled acceptance of enlargement as part of impairment
indicates that the majority did not view all increased contractual
obligations as subsumed by these considerations. Rejecting Justice
Brennan's theory, the Court expressed concern for the greater spe-
cificity given to state impairment of contractual obligations by arti-
cle I of the Constitution, a concern which may be determinative, as
it was in the instant case, in preventing retroactive application of
state law.
In Allied, after the Court limited the reach of the Blaisdell
decision, tempered the United States Trust dual standard of review,
declared substantial infringement to be the significant constitu-
tional contract concern, and accepted increased obligation as an
element of impairment, it proceeded to consider the particular cir-
cumstances surrounding enactment of the Minnesota Private Pen-
sion Benefits Protection Act and its relationship to the pension pro-
gram instituted by Allied Structural Steel. Determining that the
increased compensation due from Allied to its discharged employees
constituted a severe burden,58 the Court then analyzed the situation
before it in terms of the five factors which were found significant in
Blaisdell. While the Blaisdell framework is appropriate, the analysis
of the Court results in some misapplication of these factors to the
particular facts in Allied.
First, the Court cited the Minnesota retirement situation as one
lacking an emergency. Regardless of whether this is an arguable
issue, the existence of an emergency was not retained as an absolute
requirement for sustaining state legislation affecting contractual
agreements in either Veix5 or East New York Savings Bank. 10 This
precedent was recognized in United States Trust," and it was un-
necessary for the Court to preserve the issue in Allied.
56. 98 S. Ct. at 2723 n.16 (citing, inter alia, Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262
U.S. 432 (1923); Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 (1916)). But see B. WmOHT,
supra note 17, at 101. See generally Hale, supra note 17, at 514-16.
57. 98 S. Ct. at 2726. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2723.
59. 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
60. 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
61. 431 U.S. at 22-23 n.19.
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Second, the Court proclaimed that the Minnesota Act was not
enacted to deal with a broad, generalized economic or social prob-
lem; Justice Stewart's opinion characterized the employers covered
by the legislation as members of a narrow class. 2 Such a conclusion
ignores the substantial concern for private retirement programs evi-
denced by ERISA, a congressional attempt in 1974 to deal compre-
hensively with the coverage, vesting and funding aspects of private
pension plans throughout the country." The lack of an effective
means of assuring economic security in retirement for privately
employed individuals was the obvious impetus for the ERISA legis-
lation,"' and it would be rational to assume that the Minnesota
legislators shared labor concerns similar to their elected counter-
parts in Congress. The Minnesota Act, which was effective for sev-
eral months prior to passage of ERISA, did, in fact, contain a provi-
sion providing that the state law was to become null and void upon
passage of comparable federal statutes."6 This was an indication,
perhaps, of a legislative desire to provide corresponding ERISA-type
protection for Minnesota citizens pending outcome of similar con-
gressional proposals. The contention of the Court in Allied-that
the Minnesota law lacked a broad social or economic basis-is thus
without solid foundation when viewed in connection with parallel
national legislative action.
Ironically, in considering another Blaisdell factor-whether
the relief provided by the Minnesota Act was appropriate-the
Allied majority proceeded to describe the ERISA coverage enacted
by Congress as sufficient law in the area, citing the short lifespan
of the Minnesota Act as a debilitating feature of the pension protec-
tion scheme. 6 This reasoning not only contradicts the Blaisdell de-
cision, which looked upon the temporary nature of legislation as a
positive characteristic, but also avoids the fact that not all of the
provisions of ERISA would have applied to Allied employees in the
period mentioned by the Court. 7
62. 98 S. Ct. at 2724-25.
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975). ERISA is an acronym for Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act.
64. For background information and a discussion of major issues of private pension law
facing drafters of ERISA, see H.R. Rap. No. 93-533, supra note 2, at 1-8, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. Con CoNG. & An. NEws 4639, 4639-46. See generally Snyder, Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 11 WAKE FOREST L. Rzv. 219 (1975); Note, The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 539
(1975).
65. MiNN. STAT. § 181B (1976). For a discussion of ERISA and the preemption of state
law, see 6 FoRDHwm Uiw. L.J. 599 (1978).
66. 98 S.Ct. at 2725 n.21.
67. Although enacted on September 2, 1974, ERISA as applied to the Allied retirement
plan would not have guaranteed the payment of a substantial portion of an Allied employee's
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Justice Stewart established a more significant concern in de-
claring that the fifth factor in the Blaisdell case,-the reasonable
nature of imposed conditions-had been found wanting in Allied.
For members of the majority, the absence of gradual applicability
of the Minnesota Act (a feature of ERISA) and the disruption of the
element of employer reliance 8 were crucial to the outcome of the
case. While the Court correctly attempted to deal with these admit-
tedly important considerations, it failed to view them in conjunction
with the existing Allied plan which created an employee reliance
warranting similar judicial concern. The failure of the Court to ac-
cord equal consideration to all of the circumstances occasioning
passage of the Minnesota Act resulted in the Court inappropriately
applying the Blaisdell standard of reasonableness.
Whatever lack of merit may be subscribed to the Supreme
Court's handling of the "Blaisdell factors" in Allied, the majority
may at least be said to have addressed the relevant contract clause
concerns with the admittedly crucial exception of the dual standard
of review propounded in United States Trust. The more fundamen-
tal question to be raised, however, is whether the Minnesota pension
situation should have been dealt with under contract clause analysis
at all. Justice Brennan's dissent emphatically answered this ques-
tion in the negative and suggested that due process considerations
represent the preferable analytical standard." As previously men-
tioned,70 in the face of allegations of contract impairment by the
state, a due process analysis requires an inquiry into whether or not
the contract clause is merely a superfluous constitutional provision.
Assuming that the contract clause has been largely subsumed in the
rational relation test of the post-Blaisdell substantive due process
decisions, it is questionable whether the clause has any meaning
independent of due process. Nonetheless, as demonstrated by the
Allied opinion, at least five members of the Court would subscribe
to the clause a vitality all its own.
Even accepting the contract clause as a viable entity, the Allied
decision might have been augmented by an analysis based on the
"taking" clause as suggested in Justice Brennan's dissent.7' In gen-
eral, a "taking" analysis centers upon an assessment of the fairness
vested pension benefit until at least January 1, 1976, the earliest date on which all the vesting
and funding titles of ERISA could apply to Allied. Fleck v. Spannaus, - Minn. -, 251
N.W.2d 334, 340 (1977).
68. The absence of actuarial considerations of plant shutdowns was discussed in Bern-
stein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems and Some Proposals, 76
HARv. L. Rav. 952 (1963).
69. 98 S. Ct. at 2726 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
71. 98 S. Ct. at 2732 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
of burdens imposed by particular legislation, setting aside concern
for the public interest deemed to be at stake.2 Since, as the Court
in Allied recognized, it is not impairment of contractual obligation
which is of constitutional concern but rather substantial impair-
ment, the notion of a fairness standard is an inherent feature of
contract clause analysis even under present case law. Should the
Supreme Court follow this perspective in a situation similar to
Allied, a like result might appear to be less of an aberration.
With the Allied decision following so soon after United States
Trust, the contract clause has certainly been revived. A careful
evaluation of the decisions indicate, however, that the clause has
merely been resuscitated rather than revised. Aside from the devel-
opment of the dual standard of review in United States Trust and
the affirmation of enlargement of obligation as impairment an-
nounced in Allied, the Court has retained the traditional analysis
of the 1930's. Whether the Court will attempt to unravel the effect
of state legislation upon the "multitudinous private arrangements"
of society" can be but speculation. There is a growing sense, how-
ever, that the Court may be increasingly willing to move beyond
mere resuscitation, to revitalize and reinterpret contractual obliga-
tions in the modern setting.
JEAN F. REED
First Amendment Interest Balancing-Behind
Bars?
This casenote examines the recent decision of Houchins v.
KQED; Inc., in which the Supreme Court of the United States
narrowly construed the right of access afforded the news media
in their coverage of penal facilities. The analysis focuses upon the
first amendment methodology utilized by the Court in its deci-
sionmaking process. The author concludes with a critical assess-
ment of the Court's departure from accurate interest balancing
techinque.
Following the suicide of a prisoner in the Alameda County Jail
at Santa Rita, California, KQED, a licensed operator of both a radio
72. It has been suggested that a "takings" approach would have better justified the
holding of the Court in United States Trust. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV.
L. Rzv. 1, 90-94 (1977) (fairness-centered takings standard as a measure of clear government-
generated costs would be an effective response to the Court's concern for misuse of the police
power).
73. Justice Frankfurter used this phrase in East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230,
232 (1945).
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